I \u3cem\u3eSee\u3c/em\u3e What You\u27re Saying : Trademarked Terms and Symbols as Protected Consumer Commentary in Consumer Opinion Websites by Rochat, Leslie C.
COMMENTS
"I See What You're Saying": Trademarked Terms and




In the summer of 1999, Melinda Riddle frantically searched the
Internet, looking for information about how to contact individuals
ranked high within the corporate structure of U-Haul. An unsympa-
thetic local franchisee had lost Ms. Riddle's reservation for a moving
van, and she wished to vent her frustration to a corporate representa-
tive in the hope of finding a solution to the problem. The company's
official website did not provide the desired phone numbers. However,
the Internet search did turn up a wealth of information about the
company and its practices-all via websites posted by consumers who
had suffered a fate similar to that of Ms. Riddle. One site, calling
itself the "U-Hell Web Site," detailed, along with horror stories of
flaming vans, missing reservations, and unsympathetic customer ser-
vice representatives, the story of U-Haul's attempted lawsuit against
the site for its unauthorized use of the U-Haul logo and name.1
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1. The U-Hell website has since been removed due to a settlement agreement between U-
Haul and the website owner. See U-Haul Is No More (visited Oct. 11, 2000) <http://www.
coyotes.org/-consumer/uhell/index.html>. Other interesting U-Haul sites include: Don't Rent
from U-Haul (visited Nov. 14, 2000) <http://www.ukans.edu/-marc/uhaul>, U-Haul Trucks
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The Internet, with its ease of accessibility and wealth of informa-
tion, has become a modern symbol of the classical "marketplace of
ideas."'2 On the World Wide Web, ideas may be posted, perused, and
panned by anyone who has a modem. This access to information is
causing increasing worry on Wall Street and Madison Avenue as cor-
porations watch their trademarks appear, without permission, on the
home pages of thousands of computer users. Because the Internet is
so accessible, individual websites can disseminate information, accu-
rate or otherwise, to anyone interested in learning about the goods and
services associated with a particular trademark. On the Internet,
trademarks act as visual shorthand, instantly signifying a particular
good or service. Additionally, the association of the trademark with
information posted on a website creates a relationship between the
company and the commentary in the mind of the viewer. Over the
last decade, trademark owners have become increasingly outraged by
the uncontrolled use of their marks and have started to take legal
action against individuals who choose to use their marks without
permission.
The initial scuffle between individuals and trademark owners
broke out over the use and registration of Internet domain names.
Companies tend to select domain names that incorporate their trade-
marks in an attempt to increase the chance that a consumer looking for
information about their goods or services will find an official, author-
ized, corporate sponsored web page. A person looking for the website
of IBM, for example, would expect to reach it by typing in the address
"www.ibm.com." This domain name corresponds to the site's numer-
ic address, allowing a user to locate the site without knowing its
net/U-HAUL/index.html>, Anger Central's U-Haul Page (visited Nov. 14, 2000) <http://
www.angry.net/ companies/U/U-haul.htm>, and The U-Haul Sucks Home Page (visited Nov.
14, 2000) <http://www3.sympatico.ca/mike365/onthelist/uhallsucks/>.
2. The concept of the marketplace of ideas is rooted in the works of two philosophers, John
Milton and Alexander Meiklejohn. The former is credited with founding the idea that no one
person has a legitimate claim to the absolute truth, therefore, the pursuit of such truth requires
that all perspectives be made available to the public. See JOHN MILTON, Areopagitica, in 2
COMPLETE PROSE WORKS OF JOHN MILTON 485, 561 (1959) ("And though all the winds of
doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously, by
licensing and prohibiting, to misdoubt her strength. Let her and falsehood grapple; who ever
knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter."). Meiklejohn argues that free
expression is essential to the enhancement of self-governance, but takes a less expansive position
on free speech in comparison to Milton. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND
ITS RELATION TO SELF GOVERNMENT 25 (1948) ("What is essential is not that everyone shall
speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said."). The contemporary understanding of the
marketplace of ideas contains elements espoused by both philosophers-Milton's belief that all
perspectives on an idea are necessary in order to discover the truth regarding that idea, and
Meildejohn's assertion that everything worth saying must be said.
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numeric address.3 The assumption that a corporation will always use
a trademarked name for its domain name is not always correct, how-
ever. Because Network Solutions Incorporated, the company origi-
nally responsible for the registration of domain names, did not require
proof of authorization before allowing the registration of names
including trademarked terms, such domain names became a point of
contention almost immediately. "Cybersquatters" registered domain
names that incorporated famous trademarks. These individuals hoped
to force the trademark owner to pay significant amounts of money in
exchange for the right to use the domain name.4 As corporations
began to fight this practice, they became increasingly aware of the ease
with which unauthorized individuals could incorporate trademarks,
not only into a domain name, but into a website as well. Trademark
owners began to feel threatened by this unauthorized use and rallied
around trademark laws in search of relief.'
As trademark owners sought to control the use of their famous
marks on the Internet, websites run by fans of television shows and
movies quickly became targets of corporate "cease and desist" letters.
In 1996, attorneys for Viacom, the parent company of Paramount Tel-
evision, requested that Star Trek fans remove all copyrighted material
from their websites.6 In a similar fashion, the FOX Network, con-
cerned about the growing popularity of unauthorized websites for its
television shows The Simpsons, Millennium, and The X-Files, started
fighting with the owners of such sites over the use of logos, footage,
and even the names of these shows-a battle that rages to this day.
FOX, like many trademark owners, insists the issue is creative control,
citing "fan" sites that have disseminated, among other things, inaccu-
3. Domain names are beneficial to users for two reasons. First, the words employed in the
domain name are often easier to recall and far more intuitive than the corresponding numeric, or
IP, address. For example, the web address for Seattle University School of Law is <http://www.
law.seattleu.edu>. This domain name corresponds to the site's IP address, which is
206.81.198.77. Second, while the IP address for a site can change for any number of reasons-if
the site changes servers, for example-the domain name remains constant.
4. One of the most famous cybersquatters, Dennis Toeppen, registered thousands of
domain names and extorted exorbitant amounts of money from trademark owners. He was suc-
cessfully sued by Panavision and forced to pay for his misdeeds. See Panavision Int'l v. Toep-
pen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
5. See generally Deborah Shapley, Corporate Web Police Hunt Down E-Pirates, N.Y. TIMES,
May 19, 1997, at D5. As the unauthorized use of trademarked and copyrighted material
increases on the Internet, corporations have started to contract with firms specializing in tracking
down such use. Firms such as Dayton, Ohio based Marketwatch "help [a corporation] detect
potential infringement, dilution, tarnishment, and gerericide of trademarks" by notifying the
corporation of any unauthorized use. Id.
6. See L.A. Lorek, 'Cease and Desist,' Firns Warning Private Webmasters, FL. SUN-
SENTINEL, Aug. 31, 1997, at 4F.
7. See id.
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rate information about its shows and digitally engineered nude photos
of X-Files star Gillian Anderson.8 These corporate crackdowns on fan
sites highlight the tension between corporations and individuals;
corporations are used to enjoying a great deal of control over the
depiction of their goods or services, while individual website owners
are accustomed to having the liberty to post any information they
choose. As a result of the actions by FOX and Viacom, angered fans
have fought back, creating additional sites to chronicle their outrage.9
Recently, corporate trademark owners' increasing concern about
the Internet portrayal of their goods and services has created a move-
ment against what one search engine has dubbed "consumer opinion
websites."'' These sites, such as the "U-Hell" website, are generally
posted by individuals who feel they have been mistreated by a com-
pany and have not been given sufficient recourse elsewhere. Sites crit-
icizing the practices and products of K-Mart, Gateway, and Intel have
been contacted by lawyers representing the trademark owners and
asked to remove all trademarked names or logos from the sites."
Although many simply remove the trademarked material, or the entire
site, out of a fear of legal action, some web users are starting to resist. 12
According to Esther Dyson, chairwoman of the Electronic Frontier
Foundation,
The real issue here seems to be that [the trademark owners] feel
uncomfortable not having control over what they don't own, and
seeing it linked to what they do own. But they are going to have
to get used to it. The difference is that in the past other people's
comments about them were not as visible or persistent." 13
As individuals begin to square off against corporations by refus-
ing to remove or alter critical websites, the legal rights of both parties
will have to be more clearly defined.
8. See Amy Harmon, Web Wars: Companies Get Tough on Rogues, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 12,
1996, at Al.
9. Id. The Online Freedom Federation, comprised of Star Trek fans, has posted an online
petition against Viacom's practices. Online Freedom Federation (visited Mar. 15, 2000) <http://
www.off-hq.org>.
10. Yahoo! has given them this name, and a list of such sites can be viewed at
<http://dir.yahoo.com/Business-and-Economy/ConsumerAdvocacyandInformation/Cons
umerOpinion/IndividualCompanies>. Corporations have increasingly referred to these sites
by the less flattering term "rogue sites." Lorek, supra note 6. There are currently over 120 such
sites accessible via Yahoo! alone. See <http://dir.yahoo.com/Business-and-Economy/
Consumer__AdvocacyandInformation/Consumer_Opinion/IndividuaLCompanies>.






Although all of the aforementioned actions on the part of trade-
mark owners raise significant legal issues, this Comment is primarily
concerned with the increasing frequency with which trademark owners
challenge the rights of individuals to post consumer opinion websites.
These sites, though seldom favorable to the trademark owner, present
a type of information that often interests consumers-unsolicited,
unsponsored opinions regarding a good or service. Prior to the advent
of the Internet, such criticism was not nearly as accessible or as preva-
lent. Now, however, search engines will often pull up not only the
official website for a particular good, service, or corporation, but also
one or more corresponding consumer opinion sites as well. Thus,
when searching for "Wal-Mart," an individual is presented with a list
of several websites containing that term, including both the official
website and the unauthorized site entitled "Wal-Mart Sucks."' 4
While companies fear the effects that this proximity of message
will have on future consumers, American legal culture should not
encourage the growing corporate drive to wipe such sites from the
Internet. When a search pulls up both corporate-sponsored websites
and consumer opinion websites, the Internet serves as a marketplace of
ideas because the individual performing the search has access to a full
dialog regarding the subject of his or her search, as opposed to just a
single statement. This dialog benefits the potential consumer, and it
may also provide corporations with valuable feedback, resulting in
policy and marketing modifications that would not otherwise occur.
In this uncertain legal climate where many intellectual property
issues remain unresolved, individual website owners fear that corpora-
tions have the power to wreak financial and reputational ruin upon
those who cross them." An examination of the trademark laws, how-
ever, justifies neither this fear nor the increasing boldness of trade-
mark owners in demanding that trademarks be pulled from a
consumer opinion website. Consumers engaging in commentary must
have access to trademarked terms and symbols in order to specify the
subject of their commentary; trademarks are designed to symbolize a
good or service, and the exploitation of this symbolic function should
not be reserved for trademark owners alone.
Although there are a wide array of unresolved trademark issues
with regard to the Internet, this Comment will not address disputes
involving anything beyond the visible content of an individual's web-
14. The official website is located at <http://www.walmart.com>. To locate the critical
site, see Wal-Mart Sucks (visited Jan. 8, 2000) <http://www.Walmartsucks.com>.
15. See Lorek, supra note 6.
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site. Domain name and meta-tag issues, though often referenced in
order to demonstrate trends in analysis, are not the subjects of this
inquiry. Rather, this Comment will focus on the triumvirate of claims
most frequently asserted against individual web masters in the battle
over the propriety of consumer commentary: trademark infringe-
ment, 16 unfair competition, 17 and trademark dilution.18 A recent court
decision, Bally Total Fitness v. Faber,19 provides an example of the
analysis a court should engage in when considering whether or not a
consumer opinion website violates the rights of a trademark owner.2"
Section III of this Comment will describe this analysis in an overview
of Bally. Section IV will discuss the Lanham Act's "use in commerce"
requirement, scrutinizing recent approaches to this inquiry and
illustrating how a broad interpretation of "use in commerce" and the
tendency of courts to treat trademarks as property harms an individ-
ual's ability to engage in a dialog about products and services. Finally,
section V will demonstrate why consumer opinion websites, even if
held to be subject to suit, should not be enjoined from using trade-
marks. An examination of the statutory requirements demonstrates
that such sites do not constitute infringement, dilution, or unfair
competition.
III. ONE THAT GOT IT RIGHT: BALLY TOTAL FITNESS V. FABER
In the days before the Internet, consumers unhappy with a com-
pany's goods or services had little recourse; they could either complain
to the customer service department of the company, the Better Busi-
ness Bureau, or their next door neighbors. Without much warning to
the business community, the World Wide Web changed this
dynamic. There is an old adage that advises businesses to keep their
customers happy because, while a contented customer will tell just one
person how pleased he was with a company, an unhappy customer will
tell at least seven others how miserable his experience was. The sud-
den accessibility and pervasiveness of the Internet has modified the
scope of this adage because those forced to suffer at the hands of poor
16. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1994).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1994).
19. Bally Total Fitness v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
20. While technology changes rapidly, the law adapts to this growth at a much slower pace.
This Comment stresses a position that the author believes the courts should take with regard to
consumer opinion websites. However, it does not address the larger question of whether the
courts are the proper body to decide this issue in the first place. One could argue that this entire
debate is more appropriately resolved by the legislature, however, because it is the judicial realm
that is currently being asked to address the propriety of trademark usage on the Internet, this
Comment restricts its focus to the judicial application of trademark law.
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customer service no longer have to confine their misery to the closest
seven people-the Internet has given consumers a potential audience
of millions. The ease with which a disgruntled consumer can use a
company's trademarked material on a personal website has since
vindicated many people; however, trademark owners are growing
increasingly aware of the power of the negative press they receive on
the Internet.
Due to many a website owner's lack of legal knowledge, a corpo-
rate "cease and desist" letter often has the intended effect of coercing
an individual to take down a challenged website. These letters instill
in a website owner the fear of losing vast sums of money, a job, or
anonymity.2' To date, there are very few cases exploring the legal
issues raised by consumer opinion websites because so few of these
disputes reach the point of litigation. Recently, however, a California
district court had the opportunity to determine the legal implications
of a corporate challenge to a consumer's use of trademarked terms.
The court ultimately held such use does not constitute trademark
infringement, dilution, or unfair competition. This case is significant
because it provides an excellent model for how these disputes should
be resolved in the future. The Bally decision recognizes and reiterates
the proper scope of trademark protection while respecting the value of
consumer commentary.
In the summer of 1998, Bally Total Fitness Holding Corporation
brought an action for trademark infringement, dilution, and unfair
competition against Andrew Faber, the purveyor of a website dedi-
cated to displaying complaints about Bally health clubs.22 Faber's site
displayed, along with numerous complaints about the fitness club
chain, Bally's stylized "B" logo with the word "sucks" boldly printed
across it. It also included the disclaimer "Bally Total Fitness Com-
plaints! Un-Authorized!"24 The "Bally Sucks" site was one of many
that could be accessed via Faber's registered domain name. Also
accessible was a mail order pornography site entitled "Images of
Men," an informational website providing news about the gay com-
munity, a website featuring photographs of flowers and landscapes,
and a website advertising Faber's web design services. 2 Bally's origi-
21. See Shapely, supra note 5; Lorek, supra note 6; Harmon, supra note 8. See also Tom
Jackman, Computer Firm Ex-Employee Takes His Anger On-Line; Worker Resigns, Uses Internet to
Air Gripes, Triggering Legal Action, KAN. CITY STAR, October 8, 1996, at B2.
22. Bally, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1162.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. Each auxiliary site was gathered under the general domain name "www.compupix.
com." The URL addresses for each site is as follows: Bally Sucks (visited Aug. 21, 2000)
<http://www.compupix.com/ballysucks>; Images of Men (visited Aug. 21, 2000) <http://www.
2000]
Seattle University Law Review
nal request for a temporary restraining order against Faber, filed April
22, 1998, contained an allegation that Faber's "Images of Men" site
contained a direct link to the "Bally Sucks" page.26 In his reply, Faber
stated that the link had been removed, and the court subsequentlydenied Bally's request. 27 Bally then filed a motion for summary judg-
ment on its three claims in an attempt to enjoin Faber from using its
name or logo anywhere on his page.2' The court denied Bally's
motion on October 20, 1998, ordering instead that Faber bring his
own motion for summary judgment. 29  The court granted Faber's
motion on December 21, 1998.
In reaching its decision to grant Faber's motion for summary
judgment, the court refused to engage in the increasingly popular
broad approach to trademark dilution and unfair competition analysis,
which tends to view trademarks as discreet property apart from the
goods and services that they symbolize. The court instead applied a
much narrower view of the rights granted to trademark owners, ulti-
mately concluding Faber's use of Bally's marks was permissible.
Judge Pregerson began scrutinizing Bally's trademark infringe-
ment claim by determining whether the parties had related goods, a
necessary first step in determining whether or not Faber's use of the
trademarked terms created a likelihood of consumer confusion."0 In
the Ninth Circuit, an eight-factor test is used to evaluate whether a
likelihood of confusion exists. Under this test, a court must examine
the following: (1) the strength of the mark, (2) the proximity of the
goods, (3) the similarity of the marks, (4) any evidence of actual confu-
sion, (5) the marketing channels used by both parties, (6) the degree of
care likely to be used by the consumer, (7) the intent of the parties,
and (8) the likelihood of expansion of the product lines.3" This test,
however, applies only to "goods which, although not identical, are
related in the minds of consumers. "32 This rule protects the owner of
compupix.com/index.html>; Gay Community Information (visited Aug. 21, 2000) <http://www.
compupix.com/gay>; Landscapes (visited Aug. 21, 2000) <http://www.compupix.com/fl/
index/html>; Drew Faber Website Services (visited Aug. 21, 2000) <http://www.compupix.
com/biz/htm>.




30. Id. at 1163.
31. These specific factors come from AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49
(9th Cir. 1979). "The factors courts use to determine likelihood of confusion vary among the
circuits in detail and emphasis, but are generally similar." Robert M. Newbury, Trademark
Infringement Primer, in UNDERSTANDING BASIC TRADEMARK LAW at 720 (PLI Patents,
Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. 596, 1999).
32. Bally, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1163 (citing Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell Inc., 778 F.2d
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a mark against others using the mark in such a way as to imply a con-
nection, sponsorship, affiliation or common origin between the trade-
mark owner's good and another product.3 Although Bally asserted its
health club industry and Faber's site were "related goods" because
both used the Internet as a source to communicate with current and
potential Bally members, the court found otherwise.34 The judge
determined that the mere fact that both parties advertise on the Inter-
net did not make the goods sufficiently related.3" Additionally,
because Faber's site asserted it was unauthorized and also contained
the words "Bally Sucks," Judge Pregerson concluded that "no reason-
able consumer comparing Bally's official website with Faber's site
would assume Faber's site to come from the same source, or thought
to be affiliated with, connected with, or sponsored by, the trademark
owner. "36
Although the court found the parties did not have related goods,
it continued its analysis. It held that even if the two goods were
related, under the facts of the case, traditional trademark analysis did
not demonstrate that Faber's use created a likelihood of confusion
among consumers.37 Employing the Ninth Circuit's eight-factor test,
the court determined the "Bally Sucks" logo was not at all similar to
the original Bally logo; the former had the word "Sucks" scrawled
across the Bally logo, while the latter did not.38 Also, the judge deter-
mined that individuals searching for the official site would be skilled
enough to know that Faber's site was not affiliated with the Bally cor-
poration." The court also found there was little cause to believe either
party would expand its products or services into the relevant market of
the other.4"
Once it finished weighing the likelihood of confusion factors, the
court examined Bally's trademark dilution claim. To establish a viable
dilution claim, a trademark owner must demonstrate that another is
making commercial use of the established mark in interstate commerce
and that the use causes dilution by lessening the capacity of the
1352, 1363 (9th Cir. 1985)). Although some circuits do not treat this as a necessary first step,
most include it in their analysis when determining whether an unauthorized use of a mark will
cause consumer confusion.
33. Id. at 1163.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1163-64
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1164.
39. Id. at 1165.
40. Id. at 1166.
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owner's mark to identify and distinguish goods and services.41 Bally
argued that because both the "Bally Sucks" and "Images of Men" sites
were accessible via the same domain name, Faber diluted the Bally
mark by associating it with pornography.4 2 The court disagreed that
any such tarnishment had occurred, holding that Faber's "Bally
sucks" site did not constitute commercial use for purposes of the Lan-
ham Act. "[T]he dilution statute will not prohibit or threaten
noncommercial expression, such as parody, satire, editorial and other
forms of expression that are not part of a commercial transaction.
''
The court noted that Faber was not using the Bally mark to sell or
promote his web design services and refused to validate Bally's asser-
tion that any unauthorized use of another's mark on the Internet con-
stitutes per se commercial use.44
[T]he courts have held that trademark owners may not quash
unauthorized use of the mark by a person expressing a point of
view. This is so even if the opinion may come in the form of a
commercial setting.... If the antidilution statute were construed
as permitting a trademark owner to enjoin the use of his mark in
a noncommercial context found to be negative or offensive, then
a corporation could shield itself from criticism by forbidding the
use of its name in commentaries critical of its conduct.45
Judge Pregerson determined that even if Faber had engaged in
commercial use of Bally's trademarks, no dilution by tarnishment
occurred as a result.46 Faber used Bally's marks in the context of con-
sumer commentary, expressing his opinion that Bally engaged in prac-
tices he found distasteful and unsatisfactory. The court held that
Faber needed to have use of the marks in order to identify the source
of the goods or services about which he was complaining.4" In order
for Bally's assertion of tarnishment to be valid, the scope of the dilu-
tion statute would have to be broadened.4"
Including linked sites as grounds for finding commercial use or
dilution would extend the statute far beyond its intended pur-
pose of protecting trademark owners from uses that have the
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1167.
44. Id. at 1166.






effect of lessening. . . the capacity of a famous mark to identify
and distinguish good or services.49
The court ultimately granted Faber's motion for summary judg-
ment, determining there was no viable claim for infringement or dilu-
tion. Because Bally relied on those two claims to establish its cause of
action for unfair competition, the court ruled for Faber on that claim
as well.5 ° In conclusion, the court noted "[t]he explosion of the Inter-
net is not without its growing pains. It is an efficient means for busi-
nesses to disseminate information, but it also affords critics of those
businesses an equally efficient means of disseminating critical com-
mentary."'" The court refused to apply the broad standards desired
by Bally, striking an appropriate balance between the rights of a trade-
mark owner and the rights of an individual to engage in discourse
about a company's goods and services.
IV. CURRENT TRENDS IN "USE IN COMMERCE" ANALYSIS
Trademark protection, unlike patent or copyright protection, is
not expressly recognized in the Constitution. 2 Originally rebuffed by
the courts for its attempt to derive trademark protection from the
constitutional acknowledgement of patent and copyright law, Con-
gress ultimately succeeded in enacting trademark legislation under its
Commerce Clause authority. This statutory source for trademark pro-
tection is commonly referred to as the Lanham Act. 3 As a result of its
Commerce Clause roots, federal trademark law has several commerce-
based requirements. For example, a valid mark must be used in
commerce as a prerequisite for registration in the Primary Register.
Additionally, an infringing mark must be used in commerce before a
trademark owner may bring an infringement action under federal law.
Although the Bally court's discussion of the Lanham Act's use in
commerce requirement is sound, the confusion surrounding its appli-
cation to the Internet warrants a deeper investigation of this provision.
In order for a claim to fall under the purview of the Lanham Act,
an individual must use a mark in commerce without the permission of
49. Id. at 1168.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUSS & ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADEMARK, COPYRIGHT AND PATENT LAW 6-7
(1996). Copyright and patent protection are derived from Article 1, Section 8 of the Consti-
tution, which provides that Congress has the power to "promote the progress of science and
useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
53. DREYFUSS & KWALL, supra note 52, at 6-7.
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the registrant. Infringement, for example, requires the mark to be
used in commerce "in connection with the sale, distribution, or adver-
tising of any goods or services. '"S4 Unfair competition has a similar
requirement: use in commerce that is likely to cause confusion as to
the affiliation, connection or association of the user, or as to the brigin,
sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial
activities by another person. 5  Dilution arguably requires an even
greater degree of commercial involvement than does infringement or
unfair competition. The statute defines dilution as "commercial use in
commerce" that causes dilution of the distinctive quality of a mark. 6
Although some courts have defined the "use in commerce" and "com-
mercial use in commerce" standards very broadly in Internet cases,
such decisions could have dangerous repercussions on free speech.
When dealing with consumer opinion websites, courts should follow
the lead of the Bally decision and hold that such sites do not constitute
commercial use for purposes of the Lanham Act.
A. Broad Decisions
Some courts have articulated a very low threshold for meeting the
necessary "use in commerce" requirement when dealing with unau-
thorized trademark use on the Internet. Two recent decisions outline
such minimal requirements for Lanham Act application, that under
their analysis almost any website would be subject to scrutiny under
trademark law.
In Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. v Bucci,
Planned Parenthood sued Bucci for Lanham Act violations allegedly
resulting from his website, "www.plannedparenthood.com." s Bucci,
host of "Catholic Radio," a daily program broadcast in Syracuse, New
York, established the site in order to reach individuals searching for
Planned Parenthood's website. Bucci's site, which proclaimed "Wel-
come to the PLANNED PARENTHOOD HOME PAGE" across
the top, also displayed an image of a book entitled The Cost of Abor-
tion, by Lawrence Roberge.5s The site contained links that allowed the
viewer to read the forward and afterward of the book, Mr. Roberge's
resume, and quotations from individuals endorsing The Cost of
Abortion.59 Only after scanning this information would the visitor
54. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
57. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 1997 WL 133313 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
58. Id. at*l.
59. Id. at *2.
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understand that the book is strongly opposed to abortion.6" In addi-
tion to information about the book and the author, the site also
informed viewers of Mr. Roberge's availability for speaking engage-
ments and interviews.
The court began its analysis by noting that for Planned Parent-
hood to bring suit under the Lanham Act, Bucci must have used its
trademark to engage in some sort of commercial use.6 The court first
determined that the "use in commerce" requirement for Lanham Act
liability is merely a jurisdictional predicate, and therefore is "broad
and has sweeping reach."62
The court found that Bucci was subject to suit for several rea-
sons. First, by using the plaintiffs name in his domain name, Bucci
affected the plaintiffs ability to offer services. "Thus, even assuming
arguendo, that defendant's activities are not in interstate commerce for
Lanham Act purposes, the effect of the activities on plaintiffs inter-
state commerce activities would place defendant within the reach of
the Lanham Act."63 Second, the court held "the nature of the Internet
indicates that establishing a typical home page on the Internet, for
access to all users, would satisfy the Lanham Act's 'in commerce'• ,64
requirement.
The court next examined each claim of Planned Parenthood's
cause of action and found sufficient use in commerce under all sec-
tions. Looking first at Planned Parenthood's infringement claim, the
court found that Bucci's site was "in connection with the distribution
or advertising of goods or services. 6 ' By endorsing The Cost of Abor-
tion, the court held that Bucci was advertising within the scope of the
act, even though he did not actively sell the book or profit from any
sales made as a result of his endorsement. Additionally, the court held
that Bucci's web page was part of Catholic Radio's effort to educate
Catholics about the anti-abortion movement. Thus, because Bucci
often solicited funds for Catholic Radio (although not on the "Planned
Parenthood" site), the court found a sufficient advertising connection
between Catholic Radio and Bucci. Finally, the court held that
Bucci's use of the plaintiffs mark was "in connection with the distri-
bution of goods and services because it [was] likely to prevent some
Internet users from reaching plaintiffs own Internet site."'66 The court
60. Id.
61. Id.
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used this same commercial use analysis to evaluate the plaintiffs
unfair competition claim, effectively holding that the actions of an
individual are not independent of, and must be considered in conjunc-
tion with, that individual's website.
The court also found the requisite commercial use under Planned
Parenthood's dilution claim, which requires a "commercial use in
commerce" of another's mark. The court held that because Bucci
engaged in the promotion of The Cost of Abortion, he could be charac-
terized as a nonprofit political activist soliciting funds for his activities.
Neither trademark infringement nor dilution contains a personal profit
requirement. For this reason, the court held that a defendant need not
derive monetary gain from the use of another's mark to engage in a
commercial use in commerce.67 Because other courts had found that
fundraising activities may bring a defendant's activities within the
scope of the Lanham Act, the court concluded Bucci's fundraising for
Catholic Radio constituted commercial activity sufficient to place any
of his actions under the scrutiny of the Act.6"
In addition, the court concluded that Bucci's use was commercial
because of its effect on Planned Parenthood's ability to offer goods and
services." The court held that not only did Bucci's use of the trade-
mark provide Internet users with competing and directly opposing
information, but the use of the plaintiffs mark also actually prevented
users from reaching the plaintiffs service message.
70
Planned Parenthood's extremely low use in commerce threshold
was lowered even further in a subsequent decision by a New Jersey
district court. In December 1997, Brodsky, a member of The Out-
reach Judaism Organization, posted a website located at "www.
jewsforjesus.org" in an attempt to reach individuals searching for
information about the plaintiff organization, Jews for Jesus.7' Jews for
Jesus is an international nonprofit outreach ministry that teaches that
Jesus is the "messiah of Israel and the Savior of the World. "72 Broad-
sky's website, in contrast, articulated a mission statement completely
contrary to that of Jews for Jesus. He designed the site to prevent
individuals from learning about or accessing Jews for Jesus.73 In addi-
tion to vocalizing beliefs opposite to those of the plaintiff, the site
67. Id. at*5.
68. Id. at *6.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 290 (D.N.J. 1998).
72. Id. at 288.
73. Id. at 290-91.
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contained a hyperlink to the Outreach Judaism Organization, which
offered audiotapes and books for sale.74
Jews for Jesus alleged that Brodsky's site satisfied any use in
commerce requirement and was therefore subject to suit under the
Lanham Act.75 Brodsky denied this, arguing he was exempt from a
dilution suit because his speech was noncommercial in nature. 6 "The
exception for non-commercial use of a famous mark is intended to
prevent courts from enjoining constitutionally protected speech. That
is, the exclusion encompasses conduct such as parodies and consumer
product reviews."77  The court acknowledged that noncommercial
speech is not actionable under the Lanham Act, but it refused to hold
that Brodsky's site was sufficiently noncommercial to qualify for
protection.78
The court's extremely broad reading of the use in commerce
requirement yielded several justifications for its ultimate decision that
"www.jewsforjesus.org" was a commercial site. The court first noted
that although Brodsky's site did not directly solicit funds from its visi-
tors, the Outreach Judaism Organization site, accessible via a hyper-
text link, did solicit funds through the sale of merchandise.79  Thus,
because Brodsky's website contained a link to a site that was commer-
cial in nature, the court held the commercial use requirement for the
dilution action had been met. Additionally, the court stated "the con-
duct of the Defendant also constitutes a commercial use of the Mark
and the Name of the Plaintiff Organization, because it is designed to
harm the Plaintiff Organization commercially by disparaging it and
preventing the Plaintiff Organization from exploiting the Mark and
the Name of the Plaintiff Organization."8  This logic is arguably
circular: commercial use for the purposes of dilution exists when a
defendant engages in actions that would constitute dilution if the com-
74. Id. at 291.
75. This court only engaged in commercial use analysis under the dilution statute. The
court did not engage in any "use in commerce" analysis for the infringement or unfair competi-
tion claims brought by the plaintiff.
76. Jewsfo-rJesus, 993 F. Supp. at 307. 28 U.S.C. § 1125(c)4 states:
The following shall not be actionable under this section:
(A) Fair use of a famous mark by another person in comparative advertising or pro-
motion to identify the competing goods or services of the owner of a famous
mark.
(B) Noncommercial use of a mark.
(C) All forms of news reporting and news commentary.
77. Jews for Jesus, 993 F. Supp. at 307 (citing Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. at
1303).




Seattle University Law Review
mercial use requirement was satisfied. Such an argument jostles
uncomfortably with the policy that "[t]he non-commercial use of a
domain name that impedes a trademark owner's use of that domain
name does not constitute dilution because such use is excluded from
Section 1125(c).""s The court recognized and restated this policy but
did not apply it. Instead, the court moved in an antithetical direction,
holding Brodsky's use to be commercial in nature because it impeded
Planned Parenthood's ability to use the mark.
Both Planned Parenthood and Jews for Jesus espouse a very broad
definition of use in commerce, arguably inspired more by a desire to
punish defendants engaging in unsavory tactics than by clear legal rea-
soning. In order to reach the desired outcome, each court refused to
distinguish the actions of the individual from the trademark use in
question. For example, although neither Bucci nor Brodsky solicited
donations via their websites, the courts found commercial use because
each man was personally affiliated with a group that solicited dona-
tions or sold products and, in the case of Jews for Jesus, because the
defendant's website had a link to a commercial site. Additionally, the
courts noted that both sites could dissuade individuals from using the
services provided by each plaintiff, thereby having a commercial
impact.
The ramifications of decisions like Planned Parenthood and Jews
for Jesus are extreme in the context of the Internet. Using the logic of
these cases, any individual who posts a link to a for-profit site on his
home page engages in sufficient commercial use to be liable under the
Lanham Act for any unauthorized logo or trademarked name dis-
played on his page. Additionally, if Planned Parenthood is used as a
model, anyone affiliated with a group that raises funds, whether or not
there is a link to the group on the disputed site, will be liable for
Lanham Act claims if the individual posts a trademark on his web
page without the permission of the owner. Finally, consumer opinion
websites, which by their nature criticize company practices and there-
fore may dissuade others from using the goods or services of a trade-
mark owner, will always be found to be sufficiently commercial for
purposes of the statute. The ultimate effect of such a broad definition
of commercial use is to chill commercial speech by rendering all con-
sumer opinion websites subject to suit under the Lanham Act.
81. Id. at 307 (citing Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949,
959 (C.D. Cal. 1997)).
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B. The Modern Tendency to See Trademarks as Property
Trademarks are, in their original and traditional sense, merely a
way to help a consumer affiliate a good or service with a particular
producer or provider. For example, trademark protection does not
adhere to the word "Dell" in an of itself; rather, the law protects the
relationship between the mark and the good that the computer compa-
ny provides. Those who violate the Lanham Act do not do so merely
by using the product name or slogan of another. They do so by con-
fusing consumers as to the source of a good or by lessening the capac-
ity of a mark to identify a good.
The increasingly broad definition of use in commerce, exempli-
fied by Planned Parenthood and Jews for Jesus, illustrates a modern ten-
dency to treat trademarks as though they are "assets with their own
intrinsic value, rather than a means to an end."82 This trend does not
necessarily further the underlying goal of trademark protection, which
is to enable the public to identify a particular product as coming from
a particular source.83
According to Professor Mark Lemley, "vesting trademarks with
the mantle of property ... defeats the purpose of linking trademarks
to goods in the first place"84 because it does not further the underlying
policy goal of trademark law and may actually result in increased con-
sumer confusion.8" Lemley notes this trend is comprised of three
parts: courts making law in response to extreme cases of trademark
use by nonowners, courts treating brands as things owned in their own
right, and the tendency to be "insensitive to free speech concerns in
cases where trademark owners seek to restrict noncompetitive uses of
the trademark."86
Society pays for the increasing power of trademark owners
through increasing restrictions on freedom of expression. In a time
where trademarks themselves "form an important part of the public
dialog on economic and social issues, '"87 modern trademark owners
have been allowed to prohibit the unauthorized use of their marks to
an extent never before possible. Companies increasingly bring suit,
82. Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE
L.J. 1687, 1693 (1999).
83. Id. at 1695.
84. Id. at 1698-99.
85. Id. at 1695. The desired end result is not an increase in trademarks, but rather a clear
connection between a product and a trademark. According to Professor Lemley, we might be
better off with fewer brands "clamoring for our scarce attention" and less of the artificial product
differentiation that exists in a world where a variety of trademarks represent very similar
products. Id.
86. Id. at 1697.
87. Id. at 1711.
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not to remedy trademark violations in the traditional sense discussed
above, but rather to prevent others from using a mark to discuss, sati-
rize, or criticize the trademark owner.88 Professor Lemley notes that
"even where these cases do not succeed, the fact that they are regularly
filed and litigated to judgment may have a chilling effect on speech
that happens to involve trademarks."89  Because consumer opinion
websites regularly use a trademarked name or term to symbolize the
product or company subject to criticism, treating trademarks as pro-
perty would open all such sites to liability.
The solution to this problem is to strike a balance between the
rights of trademark owners and the rights of the general public. The
courts can do so by employing a "principled and vigorous" application
of traditional trademark law, not by creating new legal rules and prin-
ciples.9" Thus, use in commerce, the gatekeeper of trademark law,
should not be expanded to encompass the entirety of the World Wide
Web. The rejection of the standards for commercial use enunciated in
Planned Parenthood and Jews for Jesus is imperative if the consumer
dialog regarding products and services is to survive on the Internet or
in any other forum.
C. A More Realistic Approach to "Use in Commerce": A Narrow View
The Bally decision, on the narrow end of the use in commerce
spectrum, is superior to the more expansive standard because, while it
allows for trademark protection, the protection afforded is not at the
expense of public dialog. The Bally court determined that Faber's site
was not a commercial use of Bally's mark because he was not using the
trademark to sell his services as a web designer or identify his go6ds in
commerce. Rather, the site was "akin to an on-line resume."'" Ignor-
ing the per se use in commerce argument outlined in Planned Parent-
hood and urged by Jews for Jesus, the Bally court refused to find that
simple Internet use, without anything more, satisfies the Lanham Act
requirements. This conception of trademark rights is more clearly
discussed in the case of L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers.92 An
examination of this court's detailed analysis demonstrates why a
higher threshold is more appropriate for determining whether or not a
defendant has used another's mark in commerce.
88. Id. at 1712.
89. Id. at 1713.
90. See id.
91. Baly, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1167.
92. L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987).
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High Society Magazine, a monthly "erotic entertainment" maga-
zine owned by Drake Publishers, published a two page article entitled
L.L. Beam's Back-to-School Sex Catalog, a parody of L.L. Bean's
decidedly less risqu6 mail order business.93 The article displayed a
depiction of the L.L. Bean logo "and featured pictures of nude models
in sexually explicit positions using 'products' that were described in a
crudely humorous fashion."94 Not at all amused by the magazine's use
of its logo, L.L. Bean sued for, among other things, trademark
infringement, unfair competition, and trademark dilution.9" While a
Maine district court granted L.L. Bean summary judgment on the
dilution claim, the court of appeals refused to do so, finding that the
magazine's use of the plaintiff's logo did not a constitute commercial
use and therefore did not constitute dilution.
The court noted that the antidilution statute can be invoked to
regulate commercial speech, which the Supreme Court has defined as
"expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and
its audience."97 The court properly noted, however, that any regula-
tion of speech involves a First Amendment consideration that is not
easily dismissed. While the "Constitution tolerates an incidental
impact on rights of expression of commercial actors in order to prevent
a defendant from unauthorizedly merchandising his products with
another's trademark," the Constitution is offended when the antidilu-
tion statute is invoked as a basis for "enjoining the noncommercial use
of a trademark by a defendant engaged in a protected form of expres-
sion."9" The court held Drake Publishers' use of the L.L. Bean logo
did not meet the threshold definition of commercial speech. Addi-
tionally, the court found that the magazine's actions fell into a
category that is traditionally recognized as beyond the scope of com-
93. Id. at 27.
94. Id.
95. Id. The plaintiffs dilution claim was brought under a state statute, as the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act had not yet been enacted. The court's analysis is useful nonetheless,
because it thoroughly discusses the appropriate balance between a trademark owner's rights and
those rights protected by the First Amendment. The scope of the Maine antidilution statute had
yet to be clearly defined at the time of this appeal, thus, such a discussion was necessary in order
to determine whether the district court's injunction offended First Amendment rights. Id.
96. The district court allowed the trademark infringement and unfair competition claims to
continue on to trial, noting that there were factual issues regarding consumer confusion that
should be resolved by a jury. The district court found that L.L. Bean had sufficiently estab-
lished its dilution claim, however, because the article tarnished the goodwill and reputation asso-
ciated with its trademark. The defendant appealed from this summary judgment. Id. at 27.
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mercial use and is protected by the First Amendment-parody.99 The
court mentioned other categories of speech that are considered non-
commercial in nature, outside the purview of trademark protection,
and protected by the First Amendment: editorial speech and artistic
expression. 100
Trademark protection prohibits only injurious, unauthorized
commercial use of a mark by another; these rights do not "entitle the
owner to quash an unauthorized use of the mark by another who is
communicating ideas or expressing points of view."'01  The court
explicitly noted trademarks are not property in the traditional sense of
the word, but are only words or symbols that communicate the origin
of a commercial product. 0 2 Thus, trademark owners do not have
sufficient interests in those words or symbols to justify an expansive
prohibition on the use of trademarked terms by others.
The court's analysis leads to an important conclusion: a failure
to distinguish in any meaningful way between commercial and
noncommercial use could give a trademark owner the right to prohibit
the use of his mark in any context it deems offensive or negative,
thereby diluting the force of the First Amendment's guarantee of
protection for otherwise allowable expression. 3
By refusing to minimize the threshold of the commercial use
requirement, the court of appeals determined that Drake Publishers'
magazine article did not constitute commercial use of the trademark.
Although the magazine was, in itself, an article in commerce, the mark
was not used to identify or promote goods or services to consumers. It
did nothing more than identify L.L. Bean as the source of its par-
ody. 4 "The reading of [the statute] advanced by the district court
would improperly expand the scope of the antidilution statute far
beyond the frontiers of commerce and deep into the realm of
expression."0 s
This standard is narrower than that articulated by Planned Par-
enthood and Jews for Jesus, and it therefore properly grants deference to
the First Amendment when considering the scope of a trademark
owner's rights. This view still allows a trademark owner significant
recourse against those who use its mark without permission, but only
if that use is related "solely to the economic interests of the speaker
99. Id. at 33.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 29.
102. Id.
103. Id.




and its audience.""1 6 Thus, consumer opinion websites, in which an
individual has no economic interest, fall outside the scope of the
Lanham Act.
V. THE CAUSES OF ACTION: INFRINGEMENT, UNFAIR
COMPETITION AND DILUTION
Although the Bally court properly determined that Faber's use of
Bally's mark was not a commercial use, in an attempt to provide others
with direction on the issues, the court discussed each claim brought by
Bally, ultimately finding each without merit. The Bally court's deci-
sion to evaluate the plaintiffs infringement, unfair competition, and
dilution claims, despite its conclusion that Faber's use was noncom-
mercial, was an important analytical step; the judge's reasoning
demonstrates that regardless of whether consumer opinion websites
constitute commercial use, the trademark laws are, nonetheless, still
not designed to prohibit the type of speech these sites disseminate.
The court engaged in a less expansive approach to trademark law,
refusing to increase the protection afforded to trademark owners at the
expense of the free speech rights of others.
A. Trademark Infringement, Unfair Competition, and the
Likelihood of Confusion Test
The Lanham Act provides that when an individual uses the mark
of another in commerce "in connection with the sale, offering for sale,
distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connec-
tion with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive," the owner of the mark may sue for infringe-
ment." 7 Thus, the key points of inquiry are whether the plaintiff has
a valid protectable mark and whether the defendant's use of the mark
creates a likelihood of confusion.' Generally, it is not difficult for a
trademark owner to demonstrate that it has a protectable mark; regis-
tration of such a mark on the Principal Register is prima facie evidence
of the owner's exclusive right to the mark.
10 9
106. Id. at 32.
107. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(a).
108. See generally Robert M. Newbury, Trademark Infringement Primer, in UNDER-
STANDING BAsIc TRADEMARK LAW 720 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary
Property Course Handbook Series No. 596, 1999).
109. Id. Other ways to prove a protectable mark include demonstrating that the owner's
mark is arbitrary, suggestive, or descriptive with a secondary meaning. Arbitrary marks are
words that have no ties to the goods or services they represent, such as Lucent Technologies or
Apple Computers. Id. at 2. Suggestive marks imply some characteristic or quality of the good or
services, but some imagination is needed to determine the types of goods or services. Id.
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Unfair competition analysis is often performed in tandem with
trademark infringement analysis because both require the plaintiff to
demonstrate that the defendant's use of the trademark creates a likeli-
hood of consumer confusion. Unfair competition results when a
person uses a trademark in commerce in such a way that it is likely to
"cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affilia-
tion, connection, or association of such person with another person, or
as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services
or commercial activities by another person."11 Because both unfair
competition and infringement require a similar analysis, this discus-
sion will consider the causes of action together in order to demonstrate
that consumer opinion websites do not create a likelihood of consumer
confusion.
A discussion regarding consumer confusion often begins with the
determination of whether or not the plaintiff and the defendant have
related goods.' If the goods are not sufficiently related, then there is
little likelihood that the defendant's use will create consumer confu-
sion.' Related goods are those products or services that a reasonable
consumer would think come from the same source or would assume to
be "affiliated with, connected with, or sponsored by the trademark
owner." ' As mentioned previously, the Bally court properly deter-
mined that Faber's website was not related to Bally in the mind of the
average reasonable consumer. Although the court mentioned Faber's
computer design skills were not related to the health club industry, the
true deciding factor was that no consumer would assume Faber's criti-
cism of Bally was authorized or endorsed by the plaintiff. Applying
this analysis to consumer opinion websites in general, those that are
obviously not sponsored by the trademark owner, use vernacular such
as "sucks" to describe a good or service, or carry the disclaimer that
they are "unauthorized" do not have the appearance of being related to
the goods or services that they criticize.
Descriptive marks identify a "characteristic quality, purpose or some other aspect of a product"
and are not generally protectable "unless consumers associate it with a single source, which is
called a secondary meaning." Id.
110. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
111. The Bally court treated this determination as a gatekeeper element-if relatedness was
not established, then the evaluation under the Sleek'raft factors was not necessary. Other courts
treat this inquiry as one of the factors for determining whether a likelihood of confusion exists.
112. Brookfield Communication v. West Coast Entertainment, 174 F.3d 1036, 1055
(1999).
113. Bally, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1163 (citing 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:6 at 24-13 (1997)). Courts have found the following to be
related goods: Shirts and pants, Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 778 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir.
1985); Beer and whiskey, Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149 (9th
Cir. 1963); Locks and flashlights, Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1928).
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Because many courts do not explicitly inquire whether or not the
plaintiff and the defendant have related goods, it was a good analytical
decision for the Bally court to examine all eight additional likelihood
of confusion factors. These eight factors, though slightly different in
each circuit, are generally consistent. An examination of these factors
demonstrates that most consumer opinion websites do not create a
likelihood of confusion for the purposes of the Lanham Act.
Recently, a court held that when examining the unauthorized use
of trademarks on the Internet, not all of the eight factors are equally
relevant in determining whether a likelihood of consumer confusion
exists. "Some factors are much more important than others, and the
relative importance of each individual factor will be case specific.""' 4
Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment noted
that the test is pliant and that some factors will weigh more heavily
than others."' "We must be acutely aware of excessive rigidity when
applying the law in the Internet context; emerging technologies
require a flexible approach." '  Thus, when examining whether or not
a consumer opinion website causes a likelihood of confusion, some fac-
tors may not be relevant to the inquiry.
The first factor, the strength of the plaintiffs trademark, often
weighs in favor of the plaintiff. If the plaintiff has registered the mark,
spent considerable money and effort to advertise the mark, or has used
the mark consistently over time, a court will generally find that the
plaintiff has demonstrated a strong connection to the mark.
In the case of consumer opinion websites, the similarity between
the marks used by the plaintiff and the defendant is a more conten-
tious matter than the first factor. The Brookfield court noted that this
is generally the case for all infringement and unfair competition
disputes, stating that "the similarity of the marks will always be an
important factor.""' 7  When creating a consumer opinion website,
defendants often mimic the plaintiffs mark as closely as possible in an
attempt to make clear the subject of their criticism. This similarity is
not automatically fatal to the defendant, however. For example, the
Bally court determined that although the Faber site prominently dis-
played the plaintiffs stylized "B" logo, Faber's superimposing of the
word "sucks" over the top diminished any similarity."' Other opinion
websites have engaged in a practice similar to Faber's (i.e. scrawling
114. Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1054.
115. Seeid.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1054.
118. Bally, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1163.
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the word "sucks" or its equivalent across the logo), thereby illustrating
that the site is in no way a product of the trademark owner.
The Brookfield court noted that "looks aren't everything" when
attempting to discern a likelihood of confusion, therefore, it is also
important to consider the sound and meaning of the marks.119 In most
cases, the consumer website will have a logo that looks somewhat sim-
ilar to the plaintiffs, but the meaning will be very different because
the website's criticism of the plaintiff is readily apparent. If the mark
is too similar and the criticism too subtle, however, a court may find
that there is sufficient similarity between the two to cause confusion.
Thus, if the mark is not altered in some way, either facially or context-
ually, this factor may be decided in favor of the plaintiff. "The more
similar the marks in terms of appearance, sound or meaning, the
greater the likelihood of confusion. "120
The existence of evidence of actual consumer confusion is
unlikely when consumer opinion websites are at issue. In the Bally
case, the plaintiff did not seek to enter any such evidence, stating that
"consumer confusion is patently obvious in this case because [of] the
strength of the Bally marks, combined with the obvious similarities in
appearance and proximity of the marks." '121 The court determined
that because Faber included a disclaimer that the website was an
unauthorized criticism of Bally, the reasonably prudent user would not
mistake Faber's site for the official Bally website.122 Brookfield noted,
however, that this factor should not be dispositive, because actual con-
fusion is very difficult for a plaintiff to prove, therefore "difficulties in
gathering evidence of actual confusion make its absence generally
unnoteworthy."123
It is important to distinguish cases such as Planned Parenthood
and Jews for Jesus from those involving consumer opinion websites
because, in Planned Parenthood and Jews for Jesus, the defendants actu-
ally intended to confuse consumers and make them think that they had
found the plaintiffs' websites. Thus, evidence that Bucci placed a
banner across the top of the page that stated "WELCOME TO THE
PLANNED PARENTHOOD WEBSITE" would strongly support
an implication of actual confusion.
When both parties to a trademark infringement suit use the
Internet as a marketing and advertising tool, the courts have recog-
nized this as significant in increasing a likelihood of consumer confu-
119. Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1054.
120. Id.
121. Bally, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1164.
122. Id.
123. Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1050.
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sion. According to the Brookfield court, "In the Internet context, in
particular, entering a website takes little effort-usually one click from
a linked site or a search engine's list; thus, web surfers are more likely
to be confused as to the ownership of a website than traditional
patrons of a brick-and-mortar store[.]' ' 124  As computer users grow
savvier, however, this reasoning becomes less convincing. Although
the marketing channels used by both Bally and Faber included the
Internet, this did not convince the court that there would be an
increase in consumer confusion regarding the origin of Faber's site.
This is because consumer opinion websites do not tend to lead the
viewer to believe the trademark owner is the sponsor of the site. Gen-
erally, it is clear when a trademark owner does not sponsor a site criti-
cizing its goods or services. Many such sites tell personal horror
stories about the company from a first-person account, and most
employ an angry, sarcastic tone.
The next factor, the degree of care likely to be exercised by the
average consumer, must take into account the average computer user's
increasing familiarity with Internet search tools. Courts should note
that although search engines may pull up sites belonging to both
trademark owners and unaffiliated individuals when an individual
initiates a search for a trademark owner's site, individual computer
users are increasingly used to sifting through large volumes of infor-
mation in order to find what they are looking for. In the Bally case,
the plaintiff asserted "prospective users of the plaintiffs services who
mistakenly access defendant's website may fail to continue to search
for plaintiffs own home page, due to anger, frustration or the belief
that the plaintiffs home page does not exist." '125 The court found this
argument unpersuasive, noting that Faber used the Bally mark in the
context of consumer criticism rather than in the domain name and
clearly stated that his site was unauthorized.126 The court found that
one individual's site does not significantly add to the large volume of
information that the average user must sift through when performing
an Internet search. "Further, the average user may want to receive all
the information available on Bally," '127 thus, to prohibit the unauthor-
ized use of trademarks anywhere on an individual's page would pro-
hibit the individual from communicating his message to interested
consumers. The Bally decision properly notes that Internet users are
becoming increasingly adept at locating the type of information they
124. Id. at 1057.
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desire; additionally, the court's decision respects the value of con-
sumer commentary in the marketplace.
In examining a website owner's intent in selecting and using a
trademark owner's mark, courts scrutinizing consumer opinion web-
sites must realize that although individuals intentionally employ trade-
marks in their commentary, "an individual who wishes to engage in
consumer commentary must have the full range of marks that the
trademark owner has to identify the trademark owner as the object of
the criticism. ' 128 Thus, to prevent an individual from using any trade-
mark would endanger First Amendment rights. 129
Many courts do not require an element of willfulness or malice
when examining intent. Mere knowledge on the part of an individual
that he has used the mark of another has been sufficient to weigh this
element in a trademark owner's favor. 3 This factor is only relevant,
however, to the extent it bears on the likelihood that consumers will be
confused by the alleged infringer's use of the mark. In the context of
commentary, there is little cause to believe consumers will be con-
fused. This situation may again be contrasted with Planned Parent-
hood or Jews for Jesus---cases in which the defendants sought to prevent
people from visiting the plaintiffs' websites by intentionally creating
the type of confusion prohibited by trademark law.
The Bally court concluded by examining the likelihood that
Faber would expand his product lines into the same area as Bally and
determining there was no such likelihood. This will be the case in
most consumer commentary sites, as many do not even offer services,
and those that do offer services do not generally offer goods and ser-
vices in competition with those of the plaintiff. This factor is arguably
of little relevance in the context of consumer opinion websites.
In determining whether or not consumer opinion websites consti-
tute actionable infringement or unfair competition, courts applying the
eight factor test should find Bally's analysis persuasive and hold that
such sites do not create a likelihood of consumer confusion. Because
such sites are obviously not sponsored by the trademark owner,
increasingly savvy Internet users will not be confused by them or
think they represent the trademark owner in any official capacity.
B. The Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA)
Dilution differs from the previous causes of action in that it does
not require the plaintiff to demonstrate that another's use of its mark
128. Id. at 1164 n.4.
129. Id. at 1166.
130. Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1059.
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causes a likelihood of confusion. Rather, a plaintiff need only show
that another's use of its mark lessens the capacity of the famous mark
to identify its goods or services. 1 ' Trademark owners attempting to
enjoin consumer opinion websites from using their marks generally
assert that dilution has occurred via tarnishment. The threat of tar-
nishment arises when a plaintiffs trademark is linked to products that
are of shoddy or inferior quality, conjuring associations that clash with
associations generated by the owner's lawful use of the mark.
Although this cause of action seems very expansive and likely to
ensnare the owner of a consumer opinion website, the language of the
statute provides a measure of relief. The FTDA explicitly protects
unauthorized use of a trademark in certain circumstances: fair use of
another's mark in advertising, the identification of competing goods or
services, noncommercial use of goods or services, and all forms of
news reporting and commentary. 32 Currently, a majority of the deci-
sions regarding dilution have been decided in favor of the plaintiff,
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however, courts should not automatically translate this trend into a
standard that is prohibitive of consumer opinion websites. Rather,
courts should address each case in a fact specific manner, keeping in
mind the spirit of the statute and its desire to protect commentary and
discourse.
In support of its dilution claim, Bally asserted that because of the
proximity between Faber's "Bally Sucks" site and his "Images of
Men" site, Faber's website tarnished Bally's product by associating its
mark with pornography. The court did not agree with Bally's broadly
drawn view of the dilution statute, stating that "if the court accepted
this argument, it would be an impossible task to determine dilution on
the Internet. Looking beyond the "Bally Sucks" site to other sites
within the domain name or to other linked sites would, to an extent,
include the Internet in its entirety.' 13
4
The court determined that the consumer commentary itself,
regardless of what it was linked to, was valuable speech protected by
the First Amendment. Although Bally cited several cases in which a
defendant's use of a trademark was enjoined because of the mark's
unauthorized association with unsavory connotations, the court
refused to find these cases sufficiently analogous to the unauthorized
use of trademarks on consumer opinion websites. For example, in
131. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §§
23:1-124 (4th ed. 1996).
132. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
133. Lori Kraftje-Jacobs, Judicial Interpretation of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of
1995, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 659, 665 (1998).
134. Baly, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1167.
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Coca-Cola v. Gemini Rising, the defendant produced a poster modify-
ing the plaintiffs well-known catchphrase "Enjoy Coca-Cola."'  The
poster read "Enjoy Cocaine" and employed the plaintiffs trademarked
script. The Bally court agreed with the Coca-Cola court's conclusion
that this was the type of unsavory association that trademark protec-
tion was designed to prevent. The court refused to acknowledge,
however, that such an association existed in the present matter because
Faber's speech, while negative, employed Bally's name and logo only
as a means to identify the source of the goods and services about
which it was complaining.
136
The Bally analysis properly notes the important symbolic func-
tion that trademarks serve in consumer opinion websites. Website
owners employ logos, slogans, or names in combination with original
commentary to express an opinion about a good or service. Though
the composite result is often negative, it is not the type of trademark
use enjoined by the FTDA. Congress' express exception of commen-
tary from the scope of the statute evidences a legislative recognition of
its importance.
IV. CONCLUSION
In an age where the Internet is increasingly used as a method of
discourse, the judicial trend of treating trademarks as discrete property
will, if unchecked, have frightening ramifications for individuals who
use the Internet to tell others their opinions regarding goods and ser-
vices. Individuals must be able to use company names and logos in
order to communicate opinions to others in terms that are widely
understood. Without the tools of name and logo, commentary is
rendered ineffective and meaningless because it is robbed of a context.
Although several court decisions have attempted to broaden the
scope of trademark protection, this trend evidences the extent to which
the judicial system is out of sync with modern technology. In the
absence of legislative direction, courts are increasingly being called
upon to determine the fate of a technology they are unfamiliar with,
without considering the far-reaching implications of their decisions.
Judges must remember that consumer opinions are not actionable
under the trademark law, regardless of their form or pervasiveness.
Courts should not expand trademark protection beyond its statutory
scope simply because they are dealing with a new medium that has the
potential to reach an audience greater than any other.
135. Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
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Trademarks are granted limited protection, and the law should
not be interpreted so as to shield owners from any and all unwanted or
unsolicited criticism. Consumer opinion websites do not fall under
the purview of the Lanham Act for several reasons. Primarily, these
sites do not constitute commercial use, and therefore, do not meet the
threshold requirement for infringement, unfair competition, or dilu-
tion actions. Additionally, these sites do not pose a likelihood of
consumer confusion when analyzed under the multifactor test present
in each jurisdiction, nor do they constitute dilution by tarnishment of
the trademark owner's product.
Courts must not strain the parameters of trademark infringe-
ment, unfair competition, and dilution actions simply to provide a
remedy in a particular case. In their zeal to incriminate defendants
who engage in unsavory Internet tactics, some courts are creating pre-
cedent that is wholly inappropriate for general Internet application.
Future courts called on to render decisions regarding consumer opin-
ion sites should model their analysis after the Bally court's decision
and employ its far-sighted reasoning and narrower trademark protec-
tion. Although the Internet is a rapidly growing comercial entity,
courts must not forget the important discursive function it serves. If
courts continue to adhere to an expansive application of trademark
law, the Internet will serve as little more than a marketplace, and not
as a marketplace of ideas.
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